Social networks and technology adoption in Northern Mozambique by Bandiera, Oriana & Rasul, Imran
Social Networks and Technology Adoption  
in Northern Mozambique‡ 
 
by 
 
Oriana Bandiera   
London School of Economics and Political Science and CEPR 
 
and 
 
Imran Rasul 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres  
for Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
DEDPS/35    London WC2A 2AE 
June 2002    Tel:  (020) 7955 6674 
 
 
‡We would like to thank Tim Besley, Robin Burgess, Marcel Fafchamps, Raquel 
Fernandez, Andrew Foster, Markus Goldstein, Boyan Jovanovic, Magnus Lindelow, 
Ted Miguel, Rohini Pande, Debraj Ray, Giorgio Topa and seminar participants at 
New York University, LSE, NEUDC 2001 and CSAE, for useful comments. All errors 
remain our own. 
Address for correspondence – STICERD, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.  E-
mails:  o.bandiera@lse.ac.uk, I.rasul@lse.ac.uk.   
 
Abstract 
 
Despite their potentially strong impact on poverty, agricultural innovations 
are often adopted slowly.  Using a unique household dataset on sunflower 
adoption in Mozambique, we analyse whether and how individual adoption 
decisions depend upon the choices of others in the same social networks.  
Since farmers anticipate that they will share information with others, we 
expect farmers to be more likely to adopt when they know many other 
adopters.  Dynamic considerations, however, suggest that farmers who 
know many adopters might strategically delay adoption to free-ride on the 
information gathered by others.  We present empirical evidence that shows 
that the relationship between the probability of adoption and the number of 
known adopters is shaped as an inverse-U.  In line with information sharing, 
the network effect is stronger for farmers who report discussing agriculture 
with others.  The data contains information which is needed to ameliorate 
the identification issues that commonly arise in this context.  In particular 
social networks are precisely identified, and in addition we can control for 
village heterogeneity and endogenous group formation. 
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1 Introduction
The adoption of new agricultural techniques is a key route out of poverty for many in
the developing world. Yet, agricultural innovations have often been adopted slowly
and some aspects of the adoption process are still poorly understood. Recent stud-
ies have shown that, both in developing and developed countries, social networks
and peer eﬀects are an important determinant of individual behaviour in a variety
of settings. For instance, the economics suggests that many individual decisions, as
diverse as school attendance, drug use, internet adoption, and welfare participation,
are positively correlated with the behaviour of the social group the individual be-
longs to.1 Macroeconomists have identified social learning and information spillovers
as an important driving force in models of endogenous growth.2 In the context of
rural economies, it has been shown (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Conley and Udry
(2000)) that farmers within a group learn from each other how to grow new crop
varieties.3 Overall the evidence suggest that network eﬀects are important for in-
dividual decisions, and that, in the particular context of agricultural innovations,
farmers share information and learn from each other.
In this paper we analyse whether and how a farmer’s decision to adopt a new
technology depends upon the adoption decision of other farmers in his social group,
which, unlike most of the existing literature, we are able to identify precisely. The
analysis employs unique data on the adoption of sunflower for about two hundred
farmers across nine villages, in the Zambezia province, Northern Mozambique. Data
were collected in November-December 2000 together with the NGOMovimondo, who
first introduced sunflower seeds in the area at the beginning of that year. Sunflower
seeds were distributed free of charge as a part of a programme aimed at promoting
food security in the area.
We expect the individual farmer’s adoption decision to be aﬀected by the adop-
tion decision of other farmers in his network because farmers anticipate that they will
share information with others. This knowledge may relate to the best techniques with
which to grow the crop or to the profitability of the new seeds. Intuitively we expect
farmers to be more likely to adopt when they know many other adopters since, due
to information sharing, the marginal benefit of adopting the new seeds is increasing
in the number of known adopters. Dynamic considerations, however, suggest that
knowing many adopters might actually decrease the individual probability of adop-
tion. In fact, farmers might strategically delay adoption to take advantage of the
information accumulated by others in the first period. Economic theory, therefore,
1See, for instance, Bertrand et al (2000), Besley and Coate (1992), Borjas (1992 and 1995), Case
and Katz (1991), Gleaser et al (1996), Moﬃt (1983), Goolsbee and Klenow (2002), Gowrisankaran
and Stavins (1999), and Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998).
2See Benabou (1996), Durlauf (1996), Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986).
3Not surprisingly, understanding the determinants of technology adoption and of the diﬀusion
process has long been a central theme in the development literature. Early studies focus on individual
and plot characteristics, see Feder et al. (1985) for a detailed survey.
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does not provide clear predictions about the relationship between individual adop-
tion decisions and network behaviour. In particular there is no guarantee that such
relationship, if it exists, is linear or monotonic.
Our results suggest that group behaviour is an important determinant of indi-
vidual adoption choices. We find that the relationship between the probability of
adoption and the number of adopters known is shaped as an inverse U: the marginal
benefit of knowing one more adopter is positive when the farmer knows few other
adopters, while it becomes negative when the farmer knows many other adopters.
We also find evidence that information sharing is an important channel through
which group behaviour aﬀects individual adoption choices: network eﬀects are much
stronger for farmers who report discussing agricultural practices with their network
partners.
The paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a
new data set which contains information that is needed to ameliorate the identifica-
tion issues that commonly arise in this context. Second, it departs from the standard
assumption of linearity4 and presents evidence on the precise shape of the relation-
ship between individual adoption decisions and group behaviour, which, we argue,
is consistent with a trade-oﬀ between static and dynamic incentives. Our results
suggest that existing estimates are likely to be downward biased both because (i)
non-linearities are not taken into account and (ii) the social network is not precisely
measured.
The identification of the impact of social behaviour on individual choices is plagued
by many problems that can be ascribed to two main sources: correlated nonobserv-
ables and simultaneity (see Manski (1993), Moﬃtt (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2000)).
The problems deriving from correlated nonobservables are particularly serious when
the relevant social network is not properly identified. Most studies in the literature
have no direct information on the boundaries of individuals’ networks and are thus
forced to assume that networks correspond to some observed measure of geographical
or cultural proximity.5 For instance, most studies on social learning in agriculture
proxy networks by village averages, that is, they assume that individual behaviour
is a function of the mean behaviour of other individuals in the same village. In this
specification, networks are no longer individual specific, but village specific. There-
4Behrman et al.(2001) find evidence against linearity when estimating network eﬀects on family
planning decisions in Kenya. In contrast to this paper, however, they impose a specific structure
a priori, i.e. they only test whether the marginal eﬀect of knowing one adopter is larger than the
eﬀect of knowing two or more. Using employment data at the Census tract level for Los Angeles
County, Conley and Topa (2002) find that informational spillovers exhibit strong decreasing returns.
They assume that the information (I) received by each agent is a concave power function of the
total number of employed individuals in his neighborood (x), i.e. I(x) = xξ. Structural estimation
yields ξ = 0.38.
5An important exception is Conley and Udry (2000) who have collected extremely precise data on
information neighboroods. In the labour/public literature only Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) have
direct information on the composition of the relevant social group. Munshi and Myaux (2000) and
Bertrand et al. (2000) use carefully defined networks based on religion and language, respectively.
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fore, social eﬀects cannot be separated from unobservable characteristics at the village
level, e.g. soil quality, that may lead to correlated behaviour within villages. Fur-
thermore, this strategy requires all information spillovers to have the same strength.
The available evidence, however, points to the contrary: in their study of information
spillovers in job search in Los Angeles, Conley and Topa (2002), for instance, find
that spillovers are much stronger within ethnic community than across them.
Our data allows us to improve over many of the current studies. In fact, we can
identify the extension and composition of the social network a priori. Importantly,
this allows us to control for village fixed eﬀects, which capture any characteristic at
the village level — such as soil quality, weather, or the links to traders and markets —
that may drive adoption decisions.
Estimating adoption choices using cross-sectional data is complicated by the fact
that there is a dynamic structure to the adoption decision (see Besley and Case
(1993), Rogers (1995)). In other words, gains from adoption might depend upon the
history of the new technology use up to time t (or the anticipated benefits after time
t), for instance because knowledge evolves through time or because credit availability
might vary. Our data is partially immune to this sort of problems: since we have data
for the first year the innovation was introduced, there is no relevant omitted history.
Nevertheless, dynamic considerations still arise because today’s decisions aﬀect
the future. In particular, a large literature both within the context of farmers’ tech-
nology adoption in developing countries6 and of firms’ and consumers’ behaviour7
has suggested that information externalities can generate strategic delays. In our
context this implies that since farmers are uncertain about the technology and since
other farmers’ experiences with the new crop at date 0 add to the public knowledge
at date 1, each farmer has an incentive to delay adoption and then free-ride on the
information accumulated by others in the previous period.
We argue that the inverse-U relationship is consistent with the trade-oﬀ between
static (positive) and dynamic (negative) network eﬀects, where the first prevail at low
numbers of known adopters. In other words, if a farmer knows few adopters, the more
adopters he knows the more likely he is to adopt because of information sharing at
date 0. If he knows many adopters, however, the dynamic incentive to delay prevails
so that knowing one more actually decreases the probability of adoption. In contrast
to previous work, we are able to investigate this matter because we have precise
information on networks at the individual farmer’s level.
Like all studies of social interactions our analysis suﬀers from simultaneity bias or
the “reflection problem” as discussed in Manski (1993). The issue arises because the
behaviour of each farmer aﬀects the behaviour of the other farmers in his social group.
Thus the group’s behaviour aﬀects individual behaviour, which, in turn, aﬀects the
group’s behaviour. We show that the severity of this problem depends on the size
6See Bardhan and Udry (1999), Besley and Case (1998), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995).
7See e.g. Caplin and Leahy (1998), Chamley and Gale (1994), Kapur (1995), McFadden and
Train (1996).
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of the network. We derive the bias of the OLS estimator and show that when the
network is not too small8 endogeneity actually biases the OLS estimate of the network
coeﬃcient downwards.
Finally, our data allows us to control for endogenous group formation, individual
heterogeneity and observable village characteristics. We show that the results are
robust to such controls.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and
presents the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the results and addresses a
number of econometric concerns. Section 4 presents some robustness checks. Section
5 discusses the related literature and a theoretical framework to explain the results.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix. The data appendix gives full
variable definitions.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Background to the Study Area
Our study area, shown on the map in the Appendix, is in the Zambezia Province,
Northern Mozambique. Mozambique is amongst the poorest countries of the world,
ranking 168th out of 174 countries in the Human Development Index for 2000. The
country is still recovering from the turmoil of a prolonged civil war that ended in
1992. The vast majority of the population earn less than a dollar a day (per capita
income in 2000 was US$220) and around one third of national income is derived from
the agricultural sector.9
Our data were collected in December 2000, together with the NGO Movimondo.
The distribution of sunflower seeds10, which is the focus of the present study, is part
of a larger project aimed at promoting sustainable food security by 2002.11 Impor-
tantly, sunflower distribution was not conditional on participation in other Movi-
mondo projects, and adoption was not a necessary condition to be able to participate
to other projects.
The decision to introduce sunflower was taken for the following three reasons.
First, the techniques required to cultivate sunflower are not too dissimilar from those
8For instance, if the social network is symmetric and contains twenty people, we show that the
OLS estimate is biased downwards as long as the true coeﬃcient is greater than 0.05.
9In 2000, life expectancy was 44 years, adult literacy 42%, and the infant mortality rate was 131.
The figures for Northern Mozambique are worse. In addition, Mozambique was hit by severe flooding
in 2000 and 2001. The most aﬀected areas were in central Mozambique around the Zambezia river
and hence do not distort our data.
10Sunflower seeds are not widely harvested in Mozambique. In 2000, only 22,000 hectares were
devoted to sunflower production, less than 0.1% of the total land available.
11At the time of the survey, Movimondo were also engaged in another project at the village level
- improvements in storage technologies to reduce post-harvest losses. Movimondo has also been
responsible for the rehabilitation of a major local bridge.
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required for some of the most important existing cultures (maize, groundnuts).
Second, there is potential for farmers to commercialise sunflower production in the
future by selling their production of seeds to local traders. Currently there are two
principal barriers to this. First, there is a lack of legal traders (at present there are
only ten legally operating traders in the district) although many more non-licensed
traders and their intermediaries exist. The second barrier is that traders are unwill-
ing to come to villages unless they can be assured of a minimum level of sunflower
production. Movimondo is currently seeking to facilitate this process through the
formation of village level farmer association groups, which should guarantee traders
a suﬃciently high level of production and also increases the farmers collective bar-
gaining power. At the time of adoption, however, farmers did not know whether, or
when, these groups would be established in their village.
Finally, sunflower seeds can be pressed to produce oil, which is nutritionally bene-
ficial and currently lacking from the farmers’ diets. The median farmer in our sample
reports to consume oil only four days in a month. In addition, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the consumption of oil is likely to raise an individual’s social status
within the village as oil is regarded as a luxury good in rural Mozambique.
The villages are initially contacted by Movimondo extension workers, who organ-
ise a village meeting and demonstration plots to illustrate the potential benefits of
adoption. If a suﬃciently large number of farmers in a village express an interest in
the project, then Movimondo establishes a link with a contact farmer in each village
who, in turn, supplies each farmer with his desired level of seeds. Importantly, these
seeds are supplied for free. This ensures that credit constraints are not a hindrance
to adoption, and it prevents the formation of a local secondary market for sunflower
seeds.
2.2 Data
The sample was chosen in a two-step cluster process - first choosing the villages,
then households. No census is available for the study area hence it is not possible
to claim that the sample is representative of rural Mozambique. Instead, it was
decided to collect the sample to have a representative sample of villages in terms of
village wealth and soil quality.12 Nine villages were selected in total, covering 204
households.13 Within these villages, a random sample of adopters was chosen (from
Movimondo records), and we then aimed to randomly survey an equal number of
12None of the villages have adequate infrastructural links to the provincial capital, Nampula.
There is no tarmac road in the study area, although part of the tertiary road system has recently
been rehabilitated, bridge infrastructures remain weak. During the rainy season a large proportion
of the study area remains unreachable by road since several bridges remain under water. In our
data, the average travel time (on foot) to the nearest permanent market was 76 minutes, and to the
nearest road was 43 minutes. See table 1.
13In addition two villages where Movimondo will begin supplying sunflower in 2001 were also
sampled. These are not used in the regression analysis.
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non-adopters. Movimondo extension workers who had been working in each village
then administered the questionnaire. Further details of the study area, questionnaire,
and the sampling methodology can be found in Gallego-Lizon and Rasul (2001).
Reasons for (not) Adopting.
The first part of table 1A shows that most farmers decided to adopt the new crop in
order to consume the oil. As explained above, commercialising the seeds is currently
very diﬃcult and indeed very few farmers reported having done so. Interestingly,
many of the non-adopters indicate that they chose not to adopt because they were
not familiar with the techniques required for the new crop. The data also suggests
that heterogeneous crop preferences are not an important determinant of the adoption
decision: only 3% of farmers report not adopting because they did not want to give
up their existing crops.
To have some direct evidence on the importance of peer eﬀects, we asked the
farmers who lived in villages where the seeds had not been yet introduced whether
they would be more willing to adopt if others were adopting at the same time. The
answers, reported in the table B, clearly suggest that peer eﬀects are important.
Overall 92% of the thirty-seven farmers we interviewed, said they would be more
willing to adopt if either a friend, a family member or a fellow church member would
adopt at the same time. Interestingly, peer eﬀects do not cross the village borders:
only one farmer reported being more willing to adopt had his friends in other villages
adopted as well. This may be because such information is more costly to verify.
Demographic Data
Table 1 gives a complete list of descriptives by adoption status. We see that the
groups do not diﬀer significantly by observable characteristics such literacy, age and
income.14 Female headed households are more likely to adopt. We have data on
the number of months of the year for which the household is food secure, i.e. the
household has food stocks available in those months. Table 1 shows that adopters
and non-adopters do not diﬀer in their exposure to food insecurity.
We also see that the groups of adopters and non-adopters are almost identically
distributed across poverty groups (defined through asset ownership - see the data
appendix). This is as we would expect given that the seeds are distributed for free
and hence we would not expect credit constraints to hinder adoption.
Measures of Unobservable Individual Heterogeneity
We have a number of measures which may proxy for unobservable heterogeneity
amongst farmers. Examples of such unobservables include ability, entrepreneurship,
and credit constraints. We have information on whether the individual has ever
participated in any other NGO projects in the past. The majority of villages in the
village have had other NGO projects at some time. Also, we asked individuals if they
14Throughout the paper we assume households follow a unitary decison making process. To
support this assumption, note that 48% of spouses are reported as having their own plots. In
addition for those households in which the spouse does have separate plots, none of these spouses
adopt when their partner does. For non adopters the figure is 5%, which is not significantly diﬀerent.
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were aware of local agricultural prices, and if so, from which source did they obtain
this information (themselves, family members, neighbours/friends, or members of
their church).15 We use this to construct a dummy equal to one if they obtained this
price information themselves. Finally, we asked the respondents “who do you speak
to about agricultural decisions?”. Again, we construct a dummy equal to one if they
speak to at least one other source. Table 1 shows that adopters are significantly more
likely to have participated in NGO projects in the past, have obtained agricultural
price information themselves, and speak to others about agriculture in general.
Social Networks Data
We asked individuals “how many people do you know that are planting the
new cultures?” in the following categories - family, fellow church members, neigh-
bours/friends, friends in other communities, and others. We use the sum of these
as a measure of the aggregate size of the individual’s social network. The descrip-
tives given in table 1 show that adopters know significantly more other adopters than
non-adopters.16 Breaking this down by the three most important groups (family,
neighbours and church members), we find, as expected, that adopters are signifi-
cantly more likely to know adopters in each of these categories. The descriptives
suggest that there are largely no diﬀerences in the types of people in the social net-
works employed by male and female household heads. There is some weak evidence
suggesting the females are more likely to know family members, and knowing more
neighbours/friends adopting than males.
On face value, these descriptives suggest that unobservable rather than observ-
able characteristics drive adoption decisions, and that adopters have greater social
networks than non-adopters. These networks may diﬀer also by gender of household
head. The regression analysis later in this section addresses whether these partial
correlations are robust to controlling for the other covariates.
Village Characteristics
In addition to the household questionnaire, we also conducted a separate survey
with three village elders in each village, in order to obtain village level information.17
15Throughout the analysis, whenever we refer to neighbours we are referring to neighbours or
friends within the village.
16One concern is that 18% of the sample report not being numerate. As a check, we also asked in-
dividuals the same question at a diﬀerent part of the questionnaire but where the enumerator oﬀered
choices of none, 1-5, 5-10, 11-20, 21-30, more than 30, in each of the categories. We then constructed
an alternative measure of the aggregate social network based on the midpoints of these bins. We
found the correlation between the two measures to be 0.95. The correlation is not significantly
diﬀerent between those who can and cannot count.
17For want of a better expression we refer to these individuals as village elders, although they
are not necessarily above the average age of respondents in the village. The three elders in each
village are a traditional leader, the contact farmer (these are the farmers who act as intermediaries
between Movimondo and the other farmers in the village), and a political leader. The three leaders
gave largely consistent information. Wherever possible, we use the answers of the traditional leader.
Where there is missing data, we use the responses of contact farmers. The contact farmers are not
in our sample for the individual level analysis.
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The third part of Table 1 reports whether any other NGOs also operate in the village,
what infrastructure exists in each village and the distance to the main road. We
asked village elders a number of questions relating to the social insurance mechanisms
available to individuals, including “what coping strategies do people use if they have
a shortage of food?”. This question allows us to distinguish across villages where
individuals are largely self reliant, reliant on others within their own village only, or
reliant on both those in their own village and from other villages. Table 1 shows
that villages do diﬀer in the levels of infrastructure present, and in the sources of
social insurance. Some villages such as Inlepa appear to have good infrastructure
and availability of outside insurance, whereas others such as Morrua lack some of the
most basic forms of village infrastructure, and no forms of insurance are available
to members in times of food shortages. This creates enough variation in the data
across villages for us to separately identify the eﬀects of village infrastructure and
the sources of social insurance, on adoption decisions. We turn to this in the next
section.
2.3 Methodology
Following the large body of theoretical and empirical literature on peer eﬀects and
social networks, considerable attention has been devoted to the econometric problems
that typically arise in this context. The first part of this section discusses identifi-
cation issues in a general setting while the second part relates them to our specific
context and presents the methodology employed in this study.
The literature on peer eﬀects and social interactions aims to identify the eﬀect
of group behaviour on the behaviour of the individuals that belong to the group.
Let aiv denote the behaviour of individual i living in area v, and let n(i) denote the
social group of individual i. If one believes that social interactions aﬀect individual
decisions, aiv should be estimated as a function of the personal characteristics of
individual i (Xi), and the characteristics of the relevant social group i belongs to
(both their actual behaviour, an(i),v,as well as their characteristics, Xn(i),v). Assuming
linearity we have;
aiv = βXi + γan(i)v + δXn(i),v + uiv (1)
where uiv is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with any of the other covariates
as the model is correctly specified.
Using the terminology of Manski (1993), γ measures the “endogenous” social
eﬀects, i.e. the impact of group behaviour on the choice of individual i while δ
measures the “exogenous” social eﬀects, that is the direct eﬀect of the characteristics
of the group on the decision of i.
An example of an endogenous social eﬀect in our study is if individual i is more
likely to adopt if more members of his network adopt because once they adopt, i
believes his social group will be able together to solve technical problems that arise,
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or advise one another on the optimal input choice to use and so forth. Hence the
endogenous social eﬀect operates through any channel in which the fact that members
of the network have also adopted, will raise the marginal benefits of i himself adopting.
This is one reason why behaviour should therefore be correlated across the social
group.
An example of an exogenous social eﬀect in our study is where i’s social group
comprises of individuals that have some characteristic, literacy say, or their connec-
tions to local traders, which raises the marginal benefit to i adopting irrespective of
whether the members of i’s social group have themselves adopted. This provides a
reason why the actual behaviour of a social group may be correlated, but it is the
characteristics of the group as opposed to their actual behaviour which is the causal
mechanism for this correlation.
Although diﬃculties in the identification of “social” eﬀects are many and diverse
and depend on the particular context of the study, they all derive from two root
sources - simultaneity and correlated unobservables.
Simultaneity arises because social interactions are symmetric in the sense that
i’s behaviour aﬀects the behaviour of the other members of the group (i.e. an(i)v =
g(aiv)). This is known as the reflection problem - group behaviour aﬀects i’s be-
haviour, which, in turn, aﬀects the group’s behaviour. Due to simultaneity, the
parameters (β, γ, δ) in (1) are eﬃciently estimated in a system of equations, with
corresponding equations for all j ∈ n(i). It can then be shown that γ and δ — that is
the “endogenous” and the “exogenous” social eﬀects — are separately identified only
if the errors of the structural form (that is uiv and ujv for all j 6= i, j ∈ n(i)) are
uncorrelated. To see this, consider the simplest case in which i = 1 and n(i) = j = 2,
i.e. each farmer’s social group consists of only one other member. The structural
form of the model is then;
a1 = βx1 + γa2 + δx2 + u1 (2)
a2 = βx2 + γa1 + δx1 + u2
where cov(u1, u2) = 0 as the model is assumed to be correctly specified. The reduced
form is given by;
a1 = bx1 + cx2 + v1
a2 = bx2 + cx1 + v2
where b =
γδ + β
(1− γ2) , c =
γβ + δ
(1− γ2) , v1 =
u1 + γu2
(1− γ2) , v2 =
u2 + γu1
(1− γ2) (3)
Thus γ can be recovered from the covariance terms, and then the estimates of b and
c used to recover β and δ.
The assumption of uncorrelated errors, however, is appropriate if and only if
the decisions of i and j ∈ n(i) are correlated exclusively because of endogenous or
exogenous social interaction. In practice, i’s behaviour can be correlated with j’s for
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a number of other reasons — which leads to the second of the identification problems
listed above, namely correlated unobservables.
Correlated unobservables can be of two types, depending on whether they are
contextual —i.e. specific to the dimension along which groups are defined—or individual
specific. The first type are variables that aﬀect every member’s adoption decision and
are specific to the environment. For instance, if n(i) is defined as (or proxied by) the
population in a village, village unobservables such as soil quality and credit markets
make i’s decision correlated with the group’s even if social interactions are altogether
absent.18
Variables of the second type are specific to the individual and determine both the
individual outcome and the decision to join a given group. It follows that, because of
individual unobservables, group membership itself is endogenous. So, for instance if
more entrepreneurial farmers are more likely to adopt a new technology and also more
likely to be in the same social group as other entrepreneurial farmers, the individual
and the group outcome would be correlated—again even in the absence of social eﬀects.
To summarise, to be able to identify endogenous and exogenous eﬀects in the Man-
ski (1993) framework, the econometrician is required to have the following data - (i)
a complete set of individual characteristics that determine adoption. This includes
variables that we typically think of as being unobservable such as farmer ability,
entrepreneurship, “openness” towards new ideas, or credit constraints; (ii) the be-
haviour of the true social group of i, n(i) which of course assumes that n(i) has been
correctly identified; (iii) the relevant set of characteristics of the relevant social group,
Xn(i),v. Needless to say, these data requirements are very stringent, and not typically
found in data sets unless they have been specifically collected to study social eﬀects.
In the absence of any one of these sets of controls, the identification of social eﬀects
becomes confounded with the correlated unobservables problem discussed above.
Most of the existing literature is restricted by not having such rich data avail-
able, hence inevitably a number of simplifications have to be made. First, individuals
typically do not report their social groups. Rather, social groups are proxied by
geographical or cultural proximity.19 Hence it is assumed that the behaviour of in-
dividual i in village v, say, is a function of the mean behaviour of individuals in the
village, av. The important point to note is that is no longer an individual specific
determinant, but village specific. This makes it impossible to separate out social ef-
fects from unobservable characteristics at the village level that may lead to correlated
behaviour within villages.
Second, as a consequence of having to proxy the true social group of i with his
18Examples of environment-specific omitted variables in the literature on peer eﬀects on educa-
tional achievement include teacher quality and school resources when the social group is defined as
peer students in the same class.
19For instance, in the literature on neighborood eﬀects in cities individual outcomes are estimated
as a function of outcomes of other individuals in the neighborood. That is, it is implicitly assumed
that the relevant social group consists of neighbours only.
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village, it is also not possible to control for the common characteristics of the group
which may drive adoption decisions, namely, exogenous social eﬀects cannot be iden-
tified separately from endogenous social eﬀects. In short, much of the literature has
estimated the following type of specification for individual i in village v;
aiv = βXi + γav + uiv (4)
From our discussion it should now be clear that in this specification, a positive γ
coeﬃcient cannot simply be interpreted as providing evidence of any social eﬀects - it
could be simply due to common unobservables. Even in the absence of such eﬀects,
we cannot disentangle endogenous from exogenous social eﬀects.20
Our data helps us to make two improvements over many of the current studies.
First, we specifically asked each individual about their social network. Thus we can
identify the extension and composition of the social network a priori. We do not need
to make assumptions about the level at which the group is defined. In other words,
n(i) is identified in our data. This allows us to also control for village fixed eﬀects, so
we control for any characteristic at the village level that may drive adoption decisions,
such as soil quality, weather, the availability of credit, links to traders and so forth.
Whilst we do have some variables that may be proxies for sources of heterogeneity
across individuals that both drives individual adoption decisions, endogenous group
formation is still an issue in this context and will be addressed in the section on
robustness checks.
To summarise, we estimate the following equation;
aiv = βXi + γf(an(i)v) + δv + uiv (5)
where aiv ∈ {0, 1} represents the individual adoption decision, Xi is a vector of
individual characteristics, n(i) is the number of people in the same social group as i
and δv are village fixed eﬀects. We assume that i’s decision depends on the adopters in
his network and employ two alternative definitions for an(i), namely the total number
of adopters in i’s network (
P
j∈n(i) ajv) and a dummy variable that equals 1 when
there is at least one other adopter in the network. While the first is our preferred
specification, we also present results for the second as a robustness check in case
the continuous measure of the number of adopters known is subject to measurement
error.
Rather than assuming a particular functional form for f(an(i),v), we use non-
parametric methods to guide our choice of f . We then use a linear approximation for
f and estimate (2) by linear probability. Although this model might yield predicted
values outside of the feasible [0, 1] range, it is preferable to non-linear models because
20The fact that we cannot disentangle endogenous from exogenous social eﬀects would not be aided
even if we had information on n(i) and Xn(i),v. To see this, note that estimating (2) in reduced form,
then given that β 6= 0, if c 6= 0 then this can arise because endogenous social eﬀects exist (γ 6= 0)
and/or because exogenous social eﬀects exist (δ 6= 0). Hence, we can only identify if social eﬀects
exist per se, but not the causal mechanism through which they may eﬀect group behaviour.
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we can then sign a priori a number of important sources of bias such as omitted
variables. Moreover, predicted values generally belong to the [0, 1] interval as long
as the mean of the dependent variable is not too close to 0 or 1, which is true in our
case. The mean of our dependent variable, whether a farmer adopts or not, is 0.525.21
What our data lacks however is the characteristics of i’s social network, Xn(i),v.
This, in turn, precludes the use of system analysis to separate direct “exogenous”
social eﬀects from indirect or “endogenous” ones. Even if system estimation is not
feasible, we argue that it is possible to identify social eﬀects, whether direct or indi-
rect, from pure reflection. That is, we can show that abstracting away from issues
of non-linearity and assuming all individuals have the same social network of size n,
then if the true data generating process is given by;
ai = βXi + γ
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
+ δ
Ã
nX
j 6=i
Xj
!
+ ui; i = 1, ..., n
but the econometrician, due to data constraints, estimates the following model;
ai = βXi + γ
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
+ ui; i = 1, ..., n
It is implicitly assumed that the true parameters of the DGP, (β, γ, δ) are all non-
negative. If so, then the following result applies to the OLS estimate of the endogenous
social eﬀects in the misspecified model, bγ.
Proposition 1 In the absence of correlated eﬀects (cov(ui, uj)= 0 for all i 6= j):
(i) if there are no true social eﬀects (γ = δ = 0) , bγ is consistent
(ii) with social eﬀects, bγ is inconsistent. A necessary and suﬃcient condition forbγ to be downwards biased is if;
γ >
1
n− 1
where n is the size of the social network. With correlated eﬀects (cov(ui, uj)= ρ for
all i 6= j):
(i) if there are no true social eﬀects (γ = δ = 0) , bγ is inconsistent with plim bγ > 0
(ii) with social eﬀects, bγ is inconsistent. A suﬃcient condition for bγ to be down-
wards biased is
γ >
2
n− 2
In the case of uncorrelated errors, the condition required for plim bγ < γ is not
very stringent. For instance, if the true social network consists of 20 individuals, the
true γ ought to be greater than 0.05 for our estimate to underestimate it. In the
21This is obviously a direct consequence of our sampling strategy. The actual adoption rate in
the study area is considerably lower.
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second case, the conditions required for downwards bias in our estimated coeﬃcient
still hold over a wide range of (n, γ) pairs that we may a priori consider reasonable.22
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Main Findings
Tables 2 and 3 report our main findings. We first analyse the eﬀect of individual
characteristics and village mean adoption rates as in specification (2), the “classic”
variable commonly employed in the literature to proxy for social networks. We then
employ our measures of individual networks and analyse whether the data supports
the idea that knowing more adopters increases the probability of adoption. In the
same context, we explore whether the relationship is linear. Finally we attempt to
assess the extent to which network eﬀects operate through information sharing.
3.1.1 Baseline Specifications
Column 1, Table 2 estimates individual adoption decisions as a function of individual
characteristics, which can be divided into demographics, wealth/risk measures and
proxies for attitudes/entrepreneurship. To select the relevant individual character-
istics we follow the large literature on the diﬀusion of innovations (Rogers 1995),
which suggests that education, wealth, exposure to risk and exposure to media are
significant determinants of early adoption. Food security, a measure of risk exposure,
does matter for adoption: farmers who are more exposed to risk — less months of
food security — are less likely to adopt. Wealth, measured by relative asset holdings,
is not a significant determinant of adoption, which is consistent with the fact that,
as discussed above, credit constraints are not an issue in this context.23 That wealth
constraints do not matter is further confirmed by the fact that female headed house-
holds, among the poorest in our sample, are actually more likely to adopt. Female
headed households, literate and, to a certain extent, older farmers are more likely to
adopt. Past participation in other NGOs projects is included to proxy for individual
22In the discussion above we have focused exclusively on symmetric networks, i.e. networks in
which everybody knows everybody else. Existing sociological and anthropological evidence however
suggests that networks can take many other shapes. The nature of the reflection problem and the
bias of the OLS estimator depend on the exact structure of the network. (see Bandiera and Rasul
(2002)).
23The results are robust to the exclusion of the food security variable and to diﬀerent poverty
definitions. Food security does not significantly diﬀer across poverty groups, hence it is unlikely to be
acting as a proxy for wealth. We experimented with a number of baseline specifications. Throughout
we found the respondent’s education, religion, roof or wall materials all to be insignificant. In
addition we do not control for tribe as 99% of our sample belong to the Lomue tribe. This is typical
of the region. Finally to capture exposure to media we checked whether having a radio aﬀected the
probability of adoption. We found no significant impact.
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personality traits which make some better inclined towards these kind of ventures.24
We find, as expected, that past participation is NGO projects has a strong positive ef-
fect on the probability of adoption. Direct knowledge of agricultural prices separates
farmers who have invested resources into finding information for prices from farmers
who either do not know produce prices or know them through indirect sources. Direct
knowledge of prices is a proxy for farmers’ entrepreneurship and ability/opportunity
to commercialise crops. Its eﬀect is positive and significant. Finally, farmers who
discuss agricultural issues with others are also more likely to adopt. It is important
to note that all individual variables date before the introduction of sunflower seeds
and are therefore exogenous to the adoption decision.25
Column (2) includes the “classic” measure of network eﬀects, that is, mean adop-
tion rate at the village level. This specification thus replicates what much of the earlier
literature on peer eﬀects has estimated, in the form of specification (2) in the earlier
section. The results suggest that farmers who live in villages where the adoption rate
is higher are more likely to adopt, the coeﬃcient is positive and marginally signifi-
cant. Column (3) adds our measure of social networks, that is the number of adopters
known by each farmer. Individual networks have a positive and significant eﬀect, even
controlling for mean adoption rate at the village level suggesting, as suspected, that
individual networks matter over and above any village level determinants.26
There are two ways to interpret this result. First, it may suggest that some
information within the village is public, so that village adoption rates measure the
amount of this public information available to each farmer in order for him to solve
any problems that may arise after adopting. In addition there is also information
which is private to i within i’s social network, and this is picked up by the coeﬃcient
on the number of adopters known to i.
Of course, the second way to interpret the result is that there is some village level
characteristic that village adoption rates proxy for (say better quality soil) that has
24That is, non Movimondo projects previously operating in the village.
25Land size is not measured in the data since farmers themselves do not know it. Omitting land
size, however, should not invalidate the results because land is abundant in these villages. Moreover,
landholdings should be correlated with wealth, which is not a significant determinant of adoption.
We are not able to control for plot level soil quality. This concern is partly ameliorated by
two factors. First, land markets are missing. Land is mostly inherited, or obtained through the
permission of village elders. Hence it is unlikely that more able farmers would necessarily be able
to obtain better quality soil. Second, plots tend to be spread out in diﬀerent parts of the village.
If soil nutrients are randomly distributed in the village, this would reduce the variation in average
plot quality across farmers within the same village.
26A potential source of concern is that, since we do not have a complete map of village networks,
we are unable to say whether farmers belong to the same network within one village. To the extent
that they do, the standard errors are biased downwards because observations from the same group
receive the same weight as observations from diﬀerent groups. Ideally, we should cluster at the
network level. Instead, due to data limitations, we re-estimated the model correcting for clustering
at the village level—which is actually more stringent. The results, not reported for reasons of space,
are unchanged.
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nothing to do social eﬀects. The results are more in line with the latter interpretation:
indeed, if the village average were proxying for network eﬀects, its coeﬃcient should
fall once individual networks are included. A comparison of columns (2) and (3),
however, reveals that the coeﬃcient on village average does not change as a result of
the inclusion of the individual network variable. The results thus suggest that only
the information which i can obtain through his network can be useful to him. We go
on to examine this in more detail in a later section.
3.1.2 Non-linearities.
The next column shows that the relationship between the probability of adoption and
the number of adopters known is non-linear. Here we drop the village mean eﬀect
and introduce village fixed eﬀects, to control for village unobservables which could
aﬀect the adoption decision.27
In table 2, column (4) we introduce the square of the number of adopters known,
which is negative and significant, suggesting decreasing returns.28 Importantly, the
results suggest that assuming linearity leads to seriously underestimate the network
eﬀect. Evaluating at the sample mean, the estimate of the marginal eﬀect of knowing
one more adopter is three times larger than the one obtained by assuming linearity
(.034 vs/ .011).
Parametric regressions, however, provide only limited information on the shape
of the relationship between the variables of interest. To explore the matter further
we employ non-parametric methods. We first regress;
aiv = b+ cXi + d
X
j∈n(i)
ajv + δv + eiv
and then use the predicted values of the coeﬃcients to compute aiv − aˆiv, where
aˆiv = bˆ + cˆXi + bδv, and then run a kernel regression of aiv − aˆiv on the number of
adopters known. Note that by using aiv−aˆiv instead of aiv, we control for the variation
in aiv explained by individual and village characteristics. The kernel regression with
95% bootstrapped confidence intervals, is shown in figure 1. This again suggests
that the relationship between the probability of adoption and the number of adopters
known is clearly non-linear: aiv is first increasing and then decreasing in the number
of adopters known. In other words, the probability of adoption is low both when the
farmer knows very few or many other farmers who have adopted.
The result is not driven by outliers, about 20% of farmers lie to the right of
the maximum point in figure 1, that is they know more than thirteen adopters.
However, since the analysis relies on a small sample, especially for farmers who know
27Village eﬀects, not reported for reasons of space, are jointly significant.
28The fact that the relationship is non linear also allows us to dismiss the argument that knowing
many adopters might be proxying for the total size of the network, which could be correlated with
other characteristics, e.g. openness, that make adoption more likely.
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more than twenty adopters, non-parametric estimates cannot be very precise. As
further check we estimated a piecewise linear function where we allow the coeﬃcient
to be diﬀerent as suggested by the non-parametric estimates. The parametric results,
column (5) Table 2, are in line with the previous estimates: knowing between 10 and
16 adopters has a significantly stronger impact on the probability of adoption than
knowing between 1 and 9 or more than 16.
One possible explanation for the result is that people who know many adopters,
i.e. more than thirteen in our case, are systematically diﬀerent along a dimension
that reduces the probability of adoption. For instance, these could be the most
entrepreneurial farmers who are already engaged in some other profitable enterprise
and therefore not interested in cultivating sunflower. Descriptive statistics do not
show significant diﬀerences in the relevant observable dimensions such as wealth, past
participation to other NGO activities, education and most other variables. People
who know many adopters, however, are more likely to have cashew trees and to grow
(and consume) more vegetables and fruit. To check the robustness of the results
we added a cashew and fruit dummy in the regressions, which, however, were never
significant and did not aﬀect the other coeﬃcients.29
3.1.3 Does Information Sharing Matter?
We now attempt to assess whether network eﬀects operate through information shar-
ing or through other channels. To do so, we test whether network eﬀects have a
diﬀerent impact on the probability of adoption for farmers who discuss agricultural
practices with others compared to farmers who do not. Intuitively, if the impact is
the same, sharing information about agriculture cannot be the mechanism through
which network eﬀects aﬀect the probability of adoption. Columns (2) and (4) of
Table 3 include an interaction term between our network variables and a dummy
which identifies whether a farmer talks to others about agriculture. In both cases the
interaction term is positive and significant: networks eﬀects are stronger for farmers
who share information about agriculture. For instance, using the results in Column
(2) we see that the marginal eﬀect of an additional member of the farmer’s social
network adopting (in the sense that i knows that this farmer is adopting), is to raise
i’s adoption probability by 4.6%. In addition, if i talks to farmers about agriculture,
this marginal eﬀect rises by an additional 3%. Hence network eﬀects are stronger
for more “talkative” farmers. Relatedly, this shows that although mimicry might be
playing a role, we can safely rule it out as the main determinant of our estimated
social eﬀects. Indeed if mimicry were the only factor, the coeﬃcient of the network
variable should be the same for farmers who share information and for farmers who
do not.
29Note that since both fruit and cashew are trees endogeneity is not an issue. That is, both
fruit and cashew were planted before the introduction of sunflower. We cannot claim the same for
vegetables and hence do not include a vegetable dummy in the regressions.
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Columns (3) and (4) are identical to (1) and (2) except now we use the dummy
variable of whether the farmer knows anyone at all adopting to capture his social
network. Again the interaction eﬀect is positive and significant. The fact that the
dummy variable of knowing at least one farmer is not significant in this specification
is not altogether surprising given the earlier evidence that such network eﬀects are
non linear.
To conclude then, overall our results suggest that information sharing is an impor-
tant determinant of the adoption decision. In short, social eﬀects do matter. However
with our data, we cannot separate out the endogenous social eﬀects from the exoge-
nous social eﬀects. Also, there are a host of econometric concerns and robustness
checks to which we now turn.
3.2 Main Econometric Concerns
Following the analysis in section 2.3 we can classify econometric concerns according
to whether they stem from correlated unobservables or from simultaneity.
3.2.1 Unobservable Heterogeneity
Regarding correlated unobservables, we have already argued that contextual (e.g.
area specific) nonobservables are not an issue in this context because our network
variables are based on the actual network rather than on groups that are geographi-
cally or culturally close to the individual farmer. We have controlled for village level
unobservables using village fixed eﬀects throughout. Individual omitted variables,
however, are still a cause for concern.
These are of two types. First, there are individual attributes which aﬀect both
the adoption decision and the number of adopters known. Second, group membership
might be endogenous in the sense that farmers might have a personality trait, for
instance “smartness”, or a common preference to consume oil, which increases the
probability of adoption and at the same time makes them want to group with farmers
with the same trait.
Nonobservables of the first type include entrepreneurship, openness towards new
ideas, extroversion and the like. For instance, more entrepreneurial farmers are likely
to know more people for their business and at the same time more likely to adopt.
To address this issue we include individual “attitudinal” variables in all regressions.
These variables measure past participation in other NGO activities (a proxy for open-
ness to new ideas and also good attitude towards NGOs in general), whether the
farmer has direct knowledge of agricultural prices (a proxy for entrepreneurship and
commercialisation) and whether the farmer talks to others about agriculture—a proxy
for extroversion and friendliness. To assess whether these variables eﬀectively capture
some of the unobservable heterogeneity that would otherwise bias the social network
coeﬃcients upward, we compare the social network coeﬃcients that we obtain with
and without the heterogeneity controls.
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The results are reported in Table 4, columns 1-3 for the continuous network
variable-columns 4-6 for the network dummy. The models in columns 1 and 4 es-
timate the probability of adoption as a function of network eﬀects and village fixed
eﬀects only. The models in columns 2 and 5 add exogenous individual characteristics
(age, gender, education etc.). The models in columns 3 and 6 add the heterogeneity
controls. Note that the coeﬃcient on social networks does not change from 1 to 2
(respectively 4 to 5), i.e. when exogenous controls are included. This is as expected as
these exogenous variables should not be correlated to the network eﬀects. However,
the coeﬃcients on social networks in both specifications fall when the heterogeneity
controls are included (by 25% for the continuous variable). This suggests that, as
suspected, the network coeﬃcients would be overestimated if heterogeneity controls
were not included and that, most importantly, the controls we employ are, in part,
proxying for unobserved individual characteristics.
3.2.2 Endogenous Group Membership
Nonobservables of the second type are individual specific characteristics which in-
crease the probability of adoption and at the same time determine group membership.
Since we do not have data on other group members we cannot find direct proxies for
this kind of omitted variables. The issue of endogenous groups, however, arises only
to the extent that individuals are allowed to choose their network. Based on this idea,
we divide the number of adopters known into three groups: (1) number of adopters
known in the (extended) family, (2) number of adopters known in the same church,
(3) number of adopters known who are neighbours/friends. Amongst these three
groups, we argue that as a farmer cannot choose his family, and to a lesser extent
cannot choose his fellow church members, any self selection into a social group can
only occur through your choice of known neighbours/friends.30
If endogenous matching were to be the only driving force behind our estimated
network eﬀects, we should find that the coeﬃcients of groups (1) and (2) (family
and church) are not significantly diﬀerent from zero. The estimates in columns 1-
2 of table 5 show that this is clearly not the case. In column (1), knowing family
members, as well as neighbours/friends, who also adopt, increases your own adoption
probabilities. In column (2) where we allow for non linearities in the social eﬀects for
each group, we find diminishing returns to knowing members of your own family and
neighbours, on your adoption decision. Interestingly the marginal eﬀect of knowing
one more adopter in either group is very similar across the two groups, as reported
in the last four rows of the table.
30Church membership would be endogenous if religion was correlated with such unobservables and
individuals changed religion to be with people with similar traits. This appears highly implausible
to us. In addition, choice of church eﬀectively implies choice of religion as there is only one type
of each church in each village. Hence we do not observe sorting of types across churches within a
village.
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As a further check we propose another test. The test is based on the following
intuition. Suppose there is some unobservable variable that determines group mem-
bership and individual adoption probability. For example, this may be a preference
to consume oil, so that all oil lovers know one another, and similarly for oil haters.
In this case, the average number of adopters known to other adopters in i’s village
would proxy for the tastes for oil in the adopting group. Similarly, the average num-
ber of adopters known to non adopters would preference for the non adopting group’s
(dis)taste for oil. We denote the number of other adopters known to the group (either
the adopters or non-adopters) that i belongs to as being aiv, and then estimate;
aiv = βXi + γf(an(i),v) + θaiv + δv + uiv (6)
If farmers form social groups on the basis of their preference for oil, then their own
social network and the average network of other members of their group ought to be
coincident and (γ, θ) are unidentified as an(i),v = aiv. Taking a less extreme position
where tastes for oil is one reason for group formation which also drives adoption
decisions, then (γ, θ) are both individually identified31. However, we ought to find
that θ picks up any social eﬀects due to common preferences, and γ then picks up
any additional eﬀects of group membership (related to any other factor).
Column (3) in table 5 repeats our earlier preferred baseline specification for com-
parison. In columns (4) and (5) we additionally control for the average number of
adopters in i’s group (be it other adopters if i adopts, and non adopters if i does
not adopt). In column 5 we drop the village fixed eﬀects. We find that θ is both
positive and significant, suggesting that some common unobservable such as the taste
for oil, does derive group formation and adoption decisions. However, the number of
adopters known to i continues to have a positive and significant eﬀect. This social
eﬀect still has diminishing returns. One way to interpret this is that the social group
known to i has an eﬀect over and above the average group known to other adopters
(or non-adopters if i is himself a non-adopter). Hence individual social networks still
matter in addition to any unobservable that drives group formation.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Regression Specification
Throughout our analysis we have employed the linear probability model to estimate
our parameters of interest. Given that we have a dichotomous dependent variable,
it is more eﬃcient to use a probit estimator. Table 6 does this for our four main
specifications. Again we find that the relationship between the probability of adoption
and the number of known adopters is shaped as an inverse U: the square term is
31The sample correlation between
P
j∈n(i)
ajv and aiv is 0.53.
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positive and significant and the piecewise regression shows a maximum eﬀect between
10 and 16. In line with previous estimates, network eﬀects are stronger for farmers
who discuss agriculture with others and endogenous group formation does not seem
to be a concern.
4.2 Simultaneity
As an additional check we seek instruments for the number of adopters known. The
instruments we seek ought to be correlated with the social group of farmer i, but
uncorrelated to any unobservable that drives both group membership and i’s adop-
tion decisions. If our instrumentation procedure is valid we should obtain consistent
estimates of the social eﬀect.
In our survey we asked questions to serve as such instruments. In particular we
asked respondents, to list the sources, if any, they had obtained information from with
regards to two important local events - first, the electrification of the main town in the
sample area, Gile, and the rehabilitation of a bridge in the Gile District, conducted
by Movimondo. We then classified the individuals as either finding out about the
event by themselves, through others, or being unaware of the event. In addition we
use the number of diﬀerent sources of information about each event as instruments
for the number of adopters known.
The idea behind the instruments is that the farmers who did not know about
these non-agricultural events were more isolated from the community, hence un-
likely to know many people in general, while farmers who discussed the news with
friends/family were better integrated. Furthermore we require that sources of non-
agricultural information are orthogonal to those for agriculture. Table 7 reports the
first and second stage instrumental variables regressions. In the first stage, the instru-
ments are reasonably good predictors of the number of adopters known. The F-test
of under-identification of the instruments has a p-value of zero.
The second stage regressions show that after instrumenting, the coeﬃcient of
network eﬀects remains positive and significant. Moreover, the coeﬃcient is twice
as large after instrumenting, suggesting that indeed endogeneity creates a downward
bias in this context. The instrument set passes the Lagrange multiplier test of
overidentification.
4.3 Omitted Village Characteristics
The fact that the village average adoption rate is significant even after including the
measure for personal networks, combined with the fact that village fixed eﬀects are al-
ways significant suggests that village characteristics must be important determinants
of adoption. The purpose of this section is to identify some of them.
The village questionnaire contains information on a host of village characteris-
tics, such as infrastructure—schools, health centres, wells, food markets—, distance to
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main road, presence of other NGOs and available insurance mechanisms against food
shocks. We estimate our basic specification with these village characteristics using
both linear probability and probit regressions. The results, reported in Table 8, show
that farmers who live in villages that are closer to the main road are less likely to
adopt. This might be due to the fact that, since most farmers report consumption
as the main reason for adoption, farmers who live by the road have better access to
other sources of oil (e.g. traders or markets). A quick glance at the oil consumption
data does indeed suggest that, before the introduction of the new seeds, farmers in
better connected villages consumed oil more often.32 Table 8 also shows that farmers
who live in villages where another NGO is active are less likely to adopt, suggest-
ing that diﬀerent NGOs can be substitutes to an extent. Village infrastructure and
access to outside insurance are not significant determinants of adoption. Finally, as
explained in section 2 above, Movimondo, runs the programme through a contact
farmer in each village. The contact farmer holds the seeds and distributes them to
the other farmers. It could be argued that the personal characteristics of the contact
farmer matter for the probability of adoption in each village. To check for this we
controlled for contact’s age, religion, participation to past NGO projects, knowledge
of agricultural prices and radio ownership. Of these only the latter had a positive and
significant eﬀect on the probability of adoption. We also checked whether farmers
who are in the same age group or belong to the same religion as the contact farmer
were more likely to adopt. We found no evidence in favour of this eﬀect.
4.4 Alternative Poverty Measures
Throughout our analysis we have argued that as the sunflower seeds are distributed
freely to farmers, there ought to be no credit constraints to adoption. This helps us
to eliminate one of the main sources of unobservable heterogeneity that may have
spuriously led to us finding the existence of social eﬀects. Throughout our regres-
sions we have controlled for the asset poverty status of the household. Nowhere did
we find this measure to be a significant determinant of adoption decisions. As a
robustness check, we replace this poverty measure with various alternative poverty
measures based upon animal ownership, consumption of food, log(income), and a
more subjective measure based upon the questionnaire enumerator’s own assessment
of the poverty in the household. The results are reported in table 11, where we find
that none of these measures are significant determinants of the adoption decisions.
With each of them, we continue to find evidence for non linear network eﬀects.
32Ordering villages from the closest to the farther (from the main road), the average (median) oil
consumption in days per month is: 15(12), 9.4(4), 7 (4), 6.5 (4), 8.4 (4), 2 (0), 1.7 (0).
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4.5 Imitation Eﬀects
One of the major diﬃculties in studies of group behaviour is to be able to separate out
learning and coordination behaviour from simple mimicry. In other words, suppose
that farmers simply copy the behaviour of one particular focal individual in the village.
Some farmers are better able to observe the behaviour of this individual because they
are simply more “sociable”. More sociable farmers are more likely to know more
other sociable farmers. This creates correlation between observed behaviour within
a village, and the social networks known to each farmer, but the decision to adopt is
based on nothing relating to social eﬀects. This is an example of the correlated eﬀects
identified by Manski (1993) that was discussed earlier in the section on methodology.
To address this concern we collected data on the behaviour of a key individual
in the village that we suppose could act as a focal point for the behaviour of others,
namely the farmer perceived by others to be the wealthiest. Not all the such named
wealthiest farmers adopted. We control for whether they adopted or not in column
(1) of table 11. We find that the behaviour of this individual has no eﬀect in the
behaviour of other farmers in the village.33
We would have liked to have tested that if the village elder had adopted, other
farmers would adopt. Unfortunately, all village elders in our sample adopt. However,
it is possible to identify whether farmer i and the village elder share the same religion.
We thus control for whether the village elder adopts and is of the same religion as
farmer i. Column (2) shows that this does not have a significant eﬀect on adoption
decisions either and does not eliminate our earlier result that information sharing
takes place within the village. On this data though, we would not discount that the
possibility that mimicry is at least part of the story. However note that the coeﬃcients
on the social network are both unchanged. This implies that mimicry may occur but
in addition to information sharing.
5 Discussion
The analysis above shows that individual adoption decisions do depend on the adop-
tion choices of network members and that (i) individual networks matter over and
above village aggregate measures, (ii) information sharing matters (iii) the relation-
ship between the individual probability of adoption and the number of known adopters
is shaped as an inverse-U.
The fact that information sharing matters is consistent with previous findings in
the literature. Both Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2001) show
that farmers learn from each other about new techniques, in particular fertilizer use
with new crops. Munshi (1996) also attributes neighborhood eﬀects on technology
adoption to social learning. Besley and Case (1998) show that the diﬀusion process
33Similar results were obtained when we controlled for whether the farmer perceived to be the
most profitable in the village adopted.
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of HYV cotton among a small group of Indian farmers is consistent with a model in
which farmers learn from each other about the profitability of the new technology.
As suggested by both by the theoretical34 as well as the empirical labour and indus-
trial organization literature social learning and network eﬀects matter in a variety of
settings.35
In the context of technology adoption the literature has focussed on two dimen-
sions of learning: learning about the parameters of the new technology and learning
about its profitability. In our context the former seems more relevant. Indeed, when
asked why they did not adopt most farmers said they did not know how to grow the
new crop rather than being uncertain of its profitability. The distinction is, however,
irrelevant for the discussion that follows.
Can social learning explain the inverse-U relationship between the individual prob-
ability of adoption and the number of known adopters that we observe in the data?
The answer depends on whether we analyse the adoption decision at date 0 as part
of a dynamic or a static optimization problem and on whether, in addition to infor-
mation sharing, networks provide other services whose value depend on the number
of adopters within the network.
In a static framework we expect the adoption decision of other network members
to aﬀect the individual adoption decision if there are complementarities such that the
marginal benefit (cost) of adoption increases (decreases) as the number of adopters
increase. Such complementarities might arise, for instance, because farmers expect
to learn how to solve problems from other adopters. Complementarities of this type,
however, would yield a mononotically increasing, although not necessarily linear,
relationship.36 Dynamic considerations, on the other hand, suggest a reason why
farmers might be less likely to adopt when they know many adopters. As long as
knowledge can be accumulated, farmers have the option of delaying adoption for
one period and free ride on the knowledge accumulated by the farmers who have
adopted at date 0. The fact that information sharing can lead to strategic delay is
widely recognized in the literature37 and does not depend on the precise nature of
34See Banerjee (1992), Caplin and Leahy (1998), Chamley and Gale (1994), Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993,1995), Gale (1996), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Kapur (1995), McFadden and Train (1996),
Moscarini and Ottaviani (1997).
35Behrman et al (2001) and Munshi and Myaux(2000) analyse network eﬀects in family planning,
Bertrand et al (2000) analyse the impact of information sharing on welfare participation, Irwin and
Klenow (1994) analyse learning in the semiconductor industry, Thornton and Thompson (1998)
study learning spillovers in WWII shipbuilding,
36It could be argued that an increase in the number of adopting farmers drives the price of
sunflower down and hence discourages adoption. This explanation, however, is not appropriate in
this context for two reasons. First, sunflower is grown for home consumption and commercialisation
is currently very diﬃcult (see Section 2). Second, even if farmers sold their output it would be
unlikely that the quantity produced were large enough to aﬀect the price.
37Bardhan and Udry (1999), Besley and Case (1998), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) analyse the
issue in the context of technology adoption in developing countries. For other applications see Caplin
and Leahy (1998), Chamley and Gale (1994), Kapur (1995), McFadden and Train (1996).
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the shared information. The papers that are more closely related to ours (Besley and
Case (1998), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995)) formalise the issue but cannot address it
empirically since they have no information on the extension of individual networks.
We argue that static complementarities combined with dynamic incentives to delay
can yield a network eﬀect curve as the one we observe in the data, as long as the former
prevails when the farmers knows few adopters while the latter dominates when the
number of known adopters is high. Such pattern emerges when the complementarity
exhibits diminishing returns, i.e. the marginal benefit of adoption increases in the
number of adopters but at a decreasing rate, and the strategic incentive to delay is
stronger when the farmer knows many adopters. This is likely to be the case for
the following reason. Delaying adoption is beneficial because the farmer does not
cultivate the new crop at date 0 when knowledge about the technology is scarce and
profits low. Delaying adoption is costly because since farmer i does not learn at date
0, his profit at date 1 is lower than it would have been had he adopted at date 0. Such
cost, however, decreases as the number of farmers who adopt at date 0 increases. In
fact, if many farmers adopt at date 0 farmer i ’s marginal contribution to the total
stock of knowledge and hence on his profits at date 1 becomes negligible.
Alternatively, the observed inverse-U relationship between the individual proba-
bility of adoption and the number of known adopters can be explained if we take
into account the fact that in addition to information sharing, networks provide other
services whose value depend on the number of adopters within the network. One such
service is risk-sharing. First, a considerable amount of evidence does suggest that so-
cial networks are a very important channel through which individuals insure against
shocks (see Fafchamps (1992), Townsend (1994), Udry (1994) and Goldstein (1999)).
Second, the eﬀectiveness of the risk-sharing mechanism depends on the number of
adopters. Indeed, if many farmers within the same network adopt, diversification
and hence the scope for eﬀective insurance within the group are greatly reduced.
This in turn can explain why the marginal eﬀect of knowing one more adopter can
be decreasing and even negative when most network members are growing the new
crop.
Testing between these alternative explanations goes beyond the scope of this pa-
per. An appropriate test would require information on available insurance mech-
anisms and adoption decisions along the entire diﬀusion path, which are currently
unavailable. We hope to pursue such questions in future research.
6 Conclusions
We have presented evidence that “social” eﬀects are an important determinant of indi-
vidual adoption decisions. The evidence altogether suggests that information sharing
is important. We have also shown that having a precisely defined social network is
crucial for this type of analysis and that the impact of social networks on adoption is
highly non-linear. We have argued that non-linearity follows naturally from a theo-
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retical model where network eﬀects derive from information sharing and the adoption
decision is analysed as part of a dynamic optimization problem. We believe that in a
variety of contexts where social interactions are relevant, the predicted relationship
between individual decisions and group behaviour would be non-linear as well. Esti-
mates of social eﬀects should therefore be backed by a consistent theoretical model
that informs about the exact shape of the relationship. Assuming linearity may well
lead to misleading empirical results, particularly when information spillovers are the
reason why networks matter.
Our data has allowed us to deal with the issues of simultaneity and omitted
variables better than what has been feasible with earlier data sets. Yet we are left
with many unanswered questions and issues raised by the results. We conclude with
a brief discussion of each of these.
First, we find that female headed households are more likely to adopt than males.
This is in contrast to some of the earlier literature where female headed household
have often been found to be amongst the last to embrace new technologies, possibly
because they face greater credit constraints. What is it about females, over and above
the other covariates controlled for, that makes them act in such a strikingly diﬀerent
way? Our data allows us to make no further progress in this line of inquiry. What we
do know is that their network size is not significantly diﬀerent from that of males. It
would be useful to see if networks diﬀer in gender composition also. Goldstein (1999)
finds for rural Ghana, that women are more likely to insure with women and men
insure with a wider and more disparate group. It could be the case that in our sample
we have networks mainly comprised of women, who share agricultural information.
Second, the results shed light on the nature of information within the village. We
can conceive of a world in which all information is public. In this scenario, it is as
if a social planner operates in the village, dividing the villagers between those who
should grow and accumulate knowledge about the new crop now and those who would
better wait. In such a world, the actual number of adopters known by adopters and
non-adopters ought not to diﬀer. This is not what we find, despite the fact that our
villages are small. Adopters know significantly more adopters than do non-adopters.
Furthermore, the benefits of knowing adopting farmers is greater for more talkative
farmers (table 3, column 2). This suggests that there is a distinct private element to
information that can only be exploited through one’s own social network. This eﬀect
operates over and above any public information that may be present, as is picked up
by the number of other adopters known variable.
Third, endogenous social group formation is a real issue here. The eﬀect of know-
ing individuals on the basis of some unobservable characteristic, such as the taste
for oil, that also determines adoption decisions, has an eﬀect on adoption probabili-
ties (table 5, columns 5 and 6). This has implications for future policy design. For
instance, the creation of association groups, which are designed to facilitate the com-
mercialisation of sunflower seeds, could act to widen inequalities within villages if
these “high types” decide to join them. Also, any future provisions for group lending
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may be hampered by the existence of adverse selection across self-selected groups.
In line with other research, one policy intervention supported by our analysis is
the provision of insurance against food shocks. Of course, such a policy is not easily
implemented. As we have found evidence that mimicry occurs as well as information
sharing, another policy intervention that may be appropriate here is the targeting of
certain focal individuals in the village, such as village elders, or those that have par-
ticipated in past NGO projects, although here again an issue of increasing inequality
within the village arises.
Finally, it is important to stress that, due to the lack of information on relevant
variables, we cannot separate endogenous from exogenous social eﬀects, implying that
we cannot quantify the magnitude of the purely endogenous network eﬀect. Social
eﬀects operating through these two channels may have diﬀerent policy implications.
Collecting data to address these and the other concerns discussed, ought to be the
focus of future research.
7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Assuming all farmers have the same size network, n and
suppose that the adoption decision of farmer i is a linear function of his own (single)
characteristics, Xi, the adoption decisions of his network,
nP
j 6=i
aj , and the (single)
exogenous characteristics of the members of the network, Xj , where ui is an error
term. We derive the OLS estimator of γ if the econometrician, due to lack of data
on the characteristics of the social network of i, estimates a model of the form;
ai = βXi + γ
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
+ ui; i = 1, ..., n (A1)
when the true data generating process (DGP) is given by;
ai = βXi + γ
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
+ δ
Ã
nX
j 6=i
Xj
!
+ ui; i = 1, ..., n (A2)
where γ 6= 0 implies the existence of endogenous social eﬀects and δ 6= 0 implies the
existence of exogenous social eﬀects. For the time being we abstract away from the
possibility of correlated eﬀects so that;
var(ui) = σ
2
u
cov(ui, uj) = 0 for all i 6= j
Writing (A2) in vector notation;


a1
...
an

 = β


X1
...
Xn

+γ


a2 + a3 + ...+ an
...
a1 + a2 + ...+ an−1

+δ


X2 +X3 + ...+Xn
...
X1 +X2 + ...+Xn−1

+


u1
...
un


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a =βX+γZa+δZX+ u
where;
Z =


0 1 · · · 1
1
. . .
...
...
. . . 1
1 · · · 1 0


Hence the reduced form system of the DGP is;
a = [In − γZ]−1 [βIn + δZ] + [In − γZ]−1 u (A3)
where In is the n-dimensional identity matrix. Note that;
[In − γZ] =


1 −γ · · · −γ
−γ . . . ...
...
. . . −γ
−γ · · · −γ 1


is symmetric, hence [In − γZ]−1 also takes the symmetric form, with a constant a
along the leading diagonal and constant b in all oﬀ diagonal entries. Solving the
inverse identity equation yields the following pair of equations;
a− (n− 1)γb = 1
−γa+ b− (n− 2)γb = 0
and solving for (a, b) gives a = 1−γ(n−2)
1−γ2(n−1)−γ(n−2) ; b =
γ
1−γ2(n−1)−γ(n−2) . Hence;
[In − γZ]−1 = α (γ)


1− γ (n− 2) γ · · · γ
γ
. . .
...
...
. . . γ
γ · · · γ 1− γ (n− 2)


where α (γ) =
1
1− γ2(n− 1)− γ(n− 2)
Substituting back into the reduced form (A3) gives;


a1
...
an

 = α (γ)


1− γ (n− 2) γ · · · γ
γ
. . .
...
...
. . . γ
γ · · · γ 1− γ (n− 2)




β δ · · · δ
δ
. . .
...
...
. . . δ
δ · · · δ β


28
+α (γ)


1− γ (n− 2) γ · · · γ
γ
. . .
...
...
. . . γ
γ · · · γ 1− γ (n− 2)




u1
...
un


Hence after multiplying through, the reduced form of the adoption decision of farmer
i is given by;
ai = α (γ)



[β − βγ (n− 2) + (n− 1)γδ]Xi + (δ + γβ)
Ã
nP
j 6=i
Xj
!
+ [1− γ (n− 2)]ui + γ
Ã
nP
j 6=i
uj
!



; i = 1, ..., n
(A4)
Estimating (A1) using OLS;
bγ = cov(ai,
Ã
nP
j 6=i
aj
!
).var(Xi)− cov(Xi, ai).cov(Xi,
Ã
nP
j 6=i
aj
!
)
var(
Ã
nP
j 6=i
aj
!
).var(Xi)−
"
cov(Xi,
Ã
nP
j 6=i
aj
!#2
We use the reduced form (A4) to calculate the probability limit of each of these terms.
Note first that; Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
=
nX
i
ai − ai
= α (γ)



[β − βγ (n− 2) + (n− 1)γδ]
nP
i
Xi + (δ + γβ)
nP
i
Ã
nP
j 6=i
Xj
!
+ [1− γ (n− 2)]
nP
i
ui + γ
nP
i
Ã
nP
j 6=i
uj
!



−α (γ)



[β − βγ (n− 2) + (n− 1)γδ]Xi + (δ + γβ)
Ã
nP
j 6=i
Xj
!
+ [1− γ (n− 2)] ui + γ
Ã
nP
j 6=i
uj
!



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The using
nP
i
Ã
nP
j 6=i
Xj
!
= (n− 1)
nP
i
Xi this expression simplifies to;
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
= α (γ)



[β + (n− 1)γδ + δ(n− 2)]
Ã
nP
j 6=i
Xj
!
+(δ + γβ) (n− 1)Xi + γ(n− 1)ui +
Ã
nP
j 6=i
uj
!



(A5)
Denoting var(Xi) = σ
2
x for all i, then by substituting (A4) and (A5) into each com-
ponent in the formula for bγ, we obtain;
plim cov(Xi, ai) = α (γ) [β − βγ (n− 2) + (n− 1)γδ]σ2x
plim cov(Xi,
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
= α (γ) [(δ + γβ) (n− 1)]σ2x
plim var(
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
= α2 (γ)



µ
[β − βγ (n− 2) + (n− 1)γδ]2 (n− 1)
+ (δ + γβ)2 (n− 1)2
¶
σ2x
+(γ2(n− 1)2 + (n− 1)) σ2u



plim cov(ai,
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
) = α2 (γ)



(δ + γβ) (n− 1)
·
2β + 2γδ(n− 1)
+ (δ − βγ) (n− 2)
¸
σ2x
(γ(n− 1) [2− γ (n− 2)])σ2u



where recall that var(ui) = σ
2
u and we are assuming no correlated eﬀects so that
cov(ui, uj) = 0 for all i 6= j. Without loss of generality we set σ2x = 1. Substituting
the above expressions into the probability limit of bγ yields after some manipulation;
plim bγ = (δ + γβ) [β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)] + [2− γ (n− 2)] σ2u
[β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)]2 + [1 + (n− 1)γ2]σ2u
Hence we can see immediately that in the absence of endogenous and exogenous social
eﬀects;
plim bγ|γ=δ=0 = 0
and in the absence of endogenous social eﬀects only;
plim bγ|γ=0 = δ [β + δ(n− 2)]
[β + δ(n− 2)]2 + σ2u
> 0
The OLS estimate of γ underestimates the true endogenous social eﬀect, i.e. bγ < γ
when; ·
(δ + γβ) [β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)]
+ [2− γ (n− 2)] σ2u
¸
<
·
γ [β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)]2
+γ [1 + (n− 1)γ2] σ2u
¸
δ [β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)]
£
1− γ2(n− 1)− γ (n− 2)
¤
< −
£
1− γ2(n− 1)− γ (n− 2)
¤
γσ2u
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which if:
γ >
1
n− 1 (A6)
implies:
δ [β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)] > −γσ2u
which is always true.
Turning to the case where there exist correlated eﬀects in the data generating
process (A2) so that;
var(ui) = σ
2
u
cov(ui, uj) = ρ for all i 6= j
The following expressions now change from the above derivation;
plim var(
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
= α2 (γ)



µ
[β − βγ (n− 2) + (n− 1)γδ]2 (n− 1)
+ (δ + γβ)2 (n− 1)2
¶
σ2x
+(γ2(n− 1)2 + (n− 1)) σ2u + (n− 1)[2(n− 1)γ + n− 2]ρ



plim cov(ai,
Ã
nX
j 6=i
aj
!
) = α2 (γ)



(δ + γβ) (n− 1)
·
2β + 2γδ(n− 1)
+ (δ − βγ) (n− 2)
¸
σ2x
(γ(n− 1) [2− γ (n− 2)])σ2u + 2(n− 1)[(n− 1)γ2 + 1]ρ



Inserting these expressions into plim bγ now yields;
plim bγ =
(δ + γβ) [β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)] + [2− γ (n− 2)] σ2u
+2(n− 1)[(n− 1)γ2 + 1]ρ
[β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)]2 + [1 + (n− 1)γ2]σ2u
+(n− 1)[2(n− 1)γ + n− 2]ρ
so that in this case even in the absence of any social eﬀects;
plim bγ|γ=δ=0 = δ (β + δ(n− 2)) + 2(n− 1)ρ
(β + δ(n− 2))2 + σ2u + (n− 1)(n− 2)ρ
> 0
In this case bγ underestimates the true endogenous social eﬀect if;
£
δ (β + γδ(n− 1) + δ(n− 2)) + γσ2u
¤ £
1− γ2(n− 1)− γ (n− 2)
¤
+
(n− 1)[2− (n− 2)γ]ρ < 0
a necessary condition for this to hold is, as above,
γ >
1
n− 1
a suﬃcient condition is;
γ >
2
n− 2 .¥
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8 Data Appendix
We give definitions of the key variables used in the analysis here. The complete
questionnaire is in Gallego-Lizon and Rasul (2001).
Poverty Measures
All the indicators are measures of relative poverty. The asset poverty measure is
constructed as follows - a weighted sum of household assets was constructed. The
weights were as follows - radio (1), chair(.5), bed (1), water pot (.5), bicycle (2),
and jewelry (1). These weights were chosen to reflect local market prices. If a
household had a value of weighted assets less than 75% of the average in the sample,
they were classified as being “very poor”. If the household had a weighted value of
assets above 75% of the average in the sample, the household was classified as “not
poor”. All remaining households are “quite poor”. The poverty measure based upon
animal ownership was similarly constructed using the following weights - pig (2.5),
chicken (1), pigeon (.25), goat (5), canga (.75), duck (1.25), and rabbit (1). The
same bands were also used for the poverty measure based upon income. The ranges
were experimented with but these widths were chosen because they do allow us to
diﬀerentiate households between those that suﬀer from acute food insecurity (low
income levels, few possessions or animals), and those that are more food secure.
In addition we asked the enumerators, who are Movimondo extension workers,
to make a subjective assessment of the individual’s poverty status. Their reported
measures correlated quite highly with those we constructed above. For example, for
20% of households the enumerators measure coincided with the simple majority of
the constructed measures.
We also constructed a dichotomous poverty measure based upon the households
reported consumption (called food poverty). A household was classified as being poor
if they do not consume oil nor vegetables at all.
All income variables are self-reported. Income earned was asked by source of
income (own farm agriculture, working on other farms, selling drinks, formal sec-
tor work, animal production, remittances, pensions, selling stones, other agricultural
work, artisanry, selling wood, hunting, other non-agricultural work). We then aggre-
gated these figures to obtain household income.
Individual Heterogeneity
The measure of having direct knowledge of prices was constructed from the ques-
tion, “where do you get information from on the price of diﬀerent cultures?”. The
individual could either be uninformed, have their own price information, or receive
information from other sources (family, neighbours, NGO extension workers or the
radio). The measure of talking to others was similarly constructed.
Social Networks
We asked individuals “how many people do you know that are planting the new
cultures?” (none, 1-5, 5-10, 11-20, 21-30, more than 30), and “how many of these
belonged to each of the following groups?” (family, neighbours, members of same
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church, friends for other communities, others). This second question was used also
as a check on the correct classification in the first. We asked the same questions
regarding expected number of adopters for next planting season to both adopters
and non-adopters, and it is these variables that we use to construct our measures of
social networks.
Knowledge on Non-agricultural Events
We asked individuals to list the sources, if any, they had obtained information
from with regards to two important local events - first, the electrification of the main
town in the sample area, Gile, and the rehabilitation of a bridge in the Gile District.
The wording of the question was, “how did you find out about the following events?”.
If they answered from wife, family, neighbours, friends, church members or the radio,
they were classified as not having direct knowledge of these events.38 Otherwise they
could have either found out themselves, or did not know about the event.
Social Insurance
The sources of social insurance at the village level were obtained from the village
questionnaire. We asked the village elder, “what coping strategies do people use
if they have a shortage of food?”. If they replied reduce number of meals eaten,
collecting wild fruits or roots, hunting, selling belonging, use savings, work on others’
farms or temporarily migrate, we classify this as having no social insurance. If they
replied receive food from family or receive food from neighbours, this classifies this
village as having social insurance within the village. If they replied receive food from
friends in other villages we classify this as insurance with other villages.
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Study Area
Full Area: 801,600 sq km (309,500 sq mi)
Population: 15.7 million
Capital city: Maputo (pop 1.3 million)
People: African (99%, including Shangaan, Chokwe,
            Manyika, Sena and Makua)
Language: Portuguese (official), indigenous languages
Religion: Indigenous beliefs (50%), Christian (30%),
Muslim (20%)
GDP: US$12.2 billion
GDP per head: US$670
Growth: 3%
Inflation: 22%
Major industries: Food, beverages, textiles, chemicals,
petroleum
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FIGURE 1.  NETWORK EFFECTS: NON-PARAMETRIC ESTIMATES 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (standard deviations in parentheses)
WHY ADOPTERS ADOPTED WHY NON-ADOPTERS DID NOT ADOPT
0.67 0.31
(0.47) (0.47)
0.36 0.48
(0.48) (0.5)
0.15 0.02
(0.35) (0.14)
0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17)
0.72 0.17
(0.45) (0.38)
0.13
(0.33)
WOULD YOU BE MORE WILLING TO ADOPT IF..
one family member would also adopt .73
(.45)
.16
(.37)
one church member would also adopt .40
(.50)
your wife would also adopt .32
(.47)
.05
(.22)
one of your friends from another village 
would also adopt
one of your neighbours/friends would also 
adopt
I want to consume the new crop No land available
Other
Others convinced me it would be 
remunerative*
Somebody else convinced me 
it would not be remunerative
Existing crops are not remunerative
Existing crops are 
remunerative 
I thought it would be remunerative
I thought it would not be 
remunerative/no market for 
this crop
The NGO convinced me it would be 
remunerative
I did not know the production 
techniques
Sample - 37 farmers in 2 villages where seeds have not yet been offered.
* "Others"  include one or more of the following: family member, friend, 
church member, village elder, wife. Sample is 204 farmers in villages 
where Movimondo operates.
1A. Reported Reasons For Adopting (or not)
1B: Direct Evidence on Network Effects
Table 1 Continued: Descriptive Statistics
Standard Error Reported in Parentheses
Adopters Non-Adopters Difference Test : p-value
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Female Headed Households .206 .093 .113
(.039) (.029) (.049)
Can Write .645 .567 .078
(.046) (.050) (.068)
Age 41.766 39.021 .246
(1.210) (1.35) (1.81)
Months of Food Security 9.08 8.89 .198
(.165) (.157) (.228)
Log(income) (Mts) 12.30 12.75 -.442
(.259) (.163) (.305)
ASSET POVERTY (proportion in each group)
Very Poor 22.43 21.65
Quite Poor 49.53 49.48
Not Poor 28.04 28.87
INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY MEASURES
Past Participation in NGO Projects .224 .113 .111
(.040) (.032) (.052)
Direct Knowledge of Agricultural Prices .654 .515 .139
(.046) (.051) (.068)
Talks to Others About Agriculture .850 .711 .139
(.034) (.046) (.057)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
Number of Other Known Adopters 11.96 6.97 4.99
(1.24) (.924) (1.55)
Know Family Members Adopting .682 .402 .280
(.045) (.050) (.067)
Know Neighbours/Friends Adopting .794 .464 .330
(.039) (.051) (.064)
Know Church Members Adopting .290 .155 .135
(.044) (.037) (.057)
Number of Family Members Known Adopting 3.16 2.35 .808
(.370) (.40) (.542)
Number of Neighbours/Friends Known Adopting 3.70 1.77 1.93
(.386) (.262) (.467)
Number of Church Members Known Adopting 2.43 .804 1.63
(.496) (.247) (.554)
SOCIAL NETWORKS BY GENDER OF HH HEAD
Male Female Difference Test : p-value
Know Family Members Adopting .526 .677 -.151 .1187
(.038) (.084) (.092)
Know Neighbours/Friends Adopting .618 .742 -.123 .1880
(.037) (.079) (.087)
Know Church Members Adopting .225 .226 -.0004 .9963
(.032) (.075) (.081)
Number of Family Members Known Adopting 2.74 2.97 -.228 .7133
(.306) (.536) (.617)
Number of Neighbours/Friends Known Adopting 2.61 3.74 -1.13 .1074
(.266) (.632) (.686)
Number of Church Members Known Adopting 1.70 1.42 .280 .6870
(.325) (.610) (.691)
.025
.2554
.1318
.3876
.1505
.0359
.0443
.0158
.1374
.0001
.0039
.0015
.0001
.0000
.0211
Exchange rate in June 2001 was US$1 = 21235 Meticash (Mts). Test of difference based on test of proportions or test of means, not imposing the restriction 
that variances are equal. The null hypothesis is that the proportion/means are equal, against a two-sided alternative. P-values are reported at the 5% 
significance level. There are 35 female headed households in the sample.
Table 1 continued: Village Descriptives
Chiraco Inlepa Invali Jajo Khayane Mania-Naholoco Morrua Namucarrau Turbina
Total Households 20 19 34 18 32 20 27 27 14
Male Headed 17 10 31 15 27 18 20 24 11
Actual Aggregate Adoption Rate .29 .24 .12 .21 .58 .25
Travel Time To Nearest Road on Foot 
(minutes)
50 2 60 30 30 10 60 180 60
Other NGO operates in village
Food Market
Well
School
Health Post
Insurance Within Own Village
Insurance With Other Villages
0 08 2 4 4
Median Oil Consumption (days per 
month)
4 11 12
5Mean Oil Consumption (days per month) 6 15 13 13 6 9 4 2
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
T-statistics reported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Headed Household .370 .498 .476 .367 .387
(4.01) (4.29) (4.10) (3.71) (3.96)
Can Write .245 .397 .382 .210 .187
(3.42) (4.01) (3.74) (2.64) (2.39)
Age .027 .041 .039 .025 .023
(1.79) (1.77) (1.73) (1.61) (1.55)
Age Squared x 10-2 -.208 -.348 -.343 -.208 -.200
(1.24) (1.33) (1.32) (1.23) (1.20)
Asset Poverty (Quite Poor) -.053 .007 -.003 .0006 -.015
(0.59) (.06) (.03) (.01) (.16)
Asset Poverty (Not poor) -.132 .0002 .012 .025 -.016
(1.28) (.00) (.09) (.23) (.14)
Months of Food Security .027 .019 .044 .049 .051
(1.33) (.65) (1.53) (1.70) (1.79)
Past Participation in NGO Projects .232 .049 .030 .389 .370
(2.78) (.65) (.22) (3.66) (3.58)
Direct Knowledge of Agricultural Prices .199 .10 .065 .058 .066
(2.23) (1.03) (.63) (.75) (.88)
Talks to Others About Agriculture .297 .245 .201 .295 .301
(3.26) (1.94) (1.52) (2.37) (2.54)
Village Adoption Rate .522 .482
(1.76) (1.65)
Number of Other Known Adopters .011 .056
(1.64) (4.19)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.181
(3.85)
Know 1-9 Adopters .185
(2.18)
Know 10-16 Adopters .503
(4.81)
Know More Than 16 Adopters .203
(1.60)
Village Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R-squared .1950 .2510 .2708 .3366 .3486
Marginal network effect (evaluated at sample mean) .034
Test 1 (p-value reported) .000
Tests 2 (p-value reported) .013
Observations 200 112 112 183 183
Table 2: Baseline Determinants of Adoption 
All regressions are robustly estimated using Eicher-White variance covariance matrices. The omitted category for the poverty measure is "very poor". 
Complete variable definitions are given in the data appendix. Test 1  in column (5) is for the equality of the coefficients on knowing 1-9 and 10-16 adopters. 
Test 2  in column (5) is for the equality of the coefficients on knowing 10-16 and more than 16 adopters. 
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
T-statistics reported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Headed Household .367 .343 .375 .352
(3.71) (3.57) (3.77) (3.54)
Can Write .210 .203 .212 .203
(2.64) (2.58) (2.78) (2.68)
Age .025 .025 .028 .030
(1.61) (1.60) (1.80) (1.91)
Age Squared x 10-2 -.208 -.211 -.236 -.253
(1.23) (1.26) (1.41) (1.52)
Asset Poverty (Quite Poor) .0006 -.007 .016 .017
(.01) (.08) (.17) (.19)
Asset Poverty (Not poor) .025 -.008 -.008 -.020
(.23) (.08) (.08) (.18)
Months of Food Security .049 .051 .060 .060
(1.70) (1.80) (2.20) (2.23)
Past Participation in NGO Projects .389 .382 .351 .331
(3.66) (3.58) (3.58) (3.34)
Direct Knowledge of Agricultural Prices .058 .055 .079 .073
(.75) (.73) (1.08) (.99)
Talks to Others About Agriculture .295 .149 .345 .108
(2.37) (1.13) (2.86) (.67)
Number of Other Known Adopters .056 .043
(4.19) (2.61)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.181 -.212
(3.85) (4.42)
Talks to Others About Agriculture x .025
Number of Other Known Adopters (1.72)
Knows at Least One Adopter .302 .088
(3.77) (.59)
Knows at Least One Adopter x .318
Talks to Others About Agriculture (1.74)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .3366 .3510 .2771 .2895
Observations 183 183 200 200
Table 4: Heterogeneity Measures
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
T-statistics reported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Other Known Adopters .016 .016 .012
(3.05) (3.07) (2.40)
Knows at Least One Adopter .333 .331 .302
(3.84) (4.03) (3.77)
Exogenous Individual Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual Heterogeneity Measures No No Yes No No Yes
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .0916 .1960 .2845 .0916 .1774 .2771
Observations 183 183 183 200 200 200
Table 3: Social Networks and Information Sharing
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Exogenous individual characteristics are gender, can write, age, age squared, asset poverty, 
months of food security. Individual heterogeneity measures are whether participated in any other NGO projects in the past, has obtained 
knowledge of local agricultural prices by oneslf, and whether the individual talks to others about agricluture.
Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
T-statistics reported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Headed Household .332 .315 .367 .207 .240
(3.37) (2.91) (3.71) (2.89) (2.72)
Can Write .216 .189 .210 .077 .222
(2.91) (2.25) (2.64) (1.18) (2.84)
Age .028 .024 .025 .009 .016
(1.94) (1.50) (1.61) (0.71) (1.10)
Age Squared x 10-2 -.245 .209 -.208 -.00 -.010
(1.51) (1..19) (1.23) (.62) (.63)
Asset Poverty (Quite Poor) -.031 .002 .0006 -.022 -.096
(.35) (.02) (.01) (.33) 1.10)
Asset Poverty (Not poor) -.056 .032 .025 .085 -.17
(.52) (.26) (.23) (1.07) (1.76)
Months of Food Security .076 .043 .049 .036 .067
(2.97) (1.55) (1.70) 1.45) (2.95)
Past Participation in NGO Projects .333 .416 .389 .333 .283
(3.54) (3.81) (3.66) (3.46) (3.10)
Direct Knowledge of Agricultural Prices .074 .082 .058 .088 .228
(1.05) (1.06) (.75) (1.40) (3.39)
Talks to Others About Agriculture .293 .303 .295 .250 .209
(2.39) (2.37) (2.37) (2.02) (2.25)
Know Family Members Adopting .163
(2.04)
Know Neighbours Adopting .275
(3.65)
Know Church Members Adopting .046
(0.54)
Number of Family Members Known Adopting .059
(1.98)
Number of Family Members Known Adopting Squared*10-2 -.604
(2.36)
Number of Neighbours/Friends Known Adopting .075
(3.18)
Number of Neighbours/Friends Known Adopting Squared*10-2 -.298
(3.00)
Number of Church Members Known Adopting .005
(.15)
Number of Church Members Known Adopting Squared*10-2 .048
(.23)
Number of Other Known Adopters .056 .037 .035
(4.19) (2.99) (2.71)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.181 -.106 -.126
(3.85) (2.36) (2.42)
Average Number of Adopters Known in Adoption Group .121 .039
(12.31) (4.35)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
R-squared .3601 .3574 .3366 .5989 .3254
Marginal effect of family network (at sample mean) .049
95% Confidence Interval for Marginal effect of family network [-.026;.124]
Marginal effect of neigh/friends network (at sample mean) .069
95% Confidence Interval for Marginal effect of neig/friends network [.015;.123]
Observations 204 183 183 183 183
Table 5: Endogenous Social Networks
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
T-statistics reported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Headed Household .472 .485 .450 .418
(3.87) (4.13) (3.59) (3.35)
Can Write .324 .282 .313 .310
(2.90) (2.45) (2.78) (2.66)
Age .041 .042 .041 .037
(1.96) (1.98) (1.96) (1.75)
Age Squared x 10-2 -.033 -.037 -.035 -.031
(1.47) (1.57) (1.52) (1.35)
Asset Poverty (Quite Poor) .025 -.031 .012 .023
(.20) (.25) (0.10) (.18)
Asset Poverty (Not poor) .066 .005 .043 .034
(.43) (.04) (.27) (.21)
Months of Food Security .074 .083 .080 .067
(1.61) (1.79) (1.71) (1.44)
Past Participation in NGO Projects .449 .418 .444 .458
(3.71) (3.48) (3.66) (3.70)
Direct Knowledge of Agricultural Prices .099 .121 .102 .130
(1.01) (1.20) (1.04) (1.29)
Talks to Others About Agriculture .378 .416 .205 .398
(2.82) (2.98) (1.14) (2.91)
Number of Other Known Adopters .088 .074
(4.43) (3.46) (2.44)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.296 -.338
(3.87) (4.16) (2.69)
Know 1-9 Adopters .291
(2.50)
Know 10-16 Adopters .604
(4.61)
Know More Than 16 Adopters .298
(1.92)
Talks to Others About Agriculture* .030
Number of Other Known Adopters (1.74)
Number of Family Members Known Adopting .100
(2.44)
Number of Family Members Known Adopting Squared*10-2 -.940
(2.69)
Number of Neighbours/Friends Known Adopting .105
(3.46)
Number of Neighbours/Friends Known Adopting Squared*10-2 -.445
(2.57)
Number of Church Members Known Adopting -.017
(.36)
Number of Church Members Known Adopting Squared*10-2 .003
(.75)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model P-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Observations 183 183 183 183
Table 6: Probit Estimates
Table 7: Instrumental Variables Regression
T-statistics reported in parentheses
First Stage Regressions (OLS)
Dependent Variable: Number of Other Adopters Known
Source of Information for Following Projects; (1)
Electrification of Gile Yourself .79
(.35)
Others 4.01
(1.91)
-3.94  
(3.41)
R-squared .3236
F-test of underidentifiation (p-value) .0050
Observations 183
Second Stage Regressions (Linear Probability Model)
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
(1)
Female Headed Household .289
(2.06)
Can Write .212
(2.12)
Age .029
(1.61)
Age Squared x 10-2 -.028
(1.35)
Asset Poverty (Quite Poor) -.095
(.74)
Asset Poverty (Not poor) -.072
(.49)
Months of Food Security .131
(1.92)
Past Participation in NGO Projects .279
(2.10)
Direct Knowledge of Agricultural Prices .035
(.37)
Talks to Others About Agriculture .217
(1.42)
Number of Other Known Adopters .056
(1.87)
Village Fixed Effects Yes
Test of Overidentification (p-value) .6913
Observations 183
Number of Sources of Information on Electrification 
of Gile
Table 8: Omitted Village Characteristics
T-statistics reported in parentheses
Number of Other Known Adopters .054
((4.19)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.178
(3.85)
Other NGO Projects Operate in Village -.203
(1.99)
Distance from Main Road .004 
(3.47)
External Insurance Available -.018
(.18)
Food Market .162
(.99)
Well .139
(.86)
School -.092
(.50)
Health Post (.047)
(.48)
Joint Test of Village Variables (p-value reported) .0118
R-squared .3355
Observations 189
Table 9: Alternative Poverty Measures
 
Dependent Variable = 1 if household head decides to adopt sunflower, 0 otherwise
T-statistics reported in parentheses
Animal 
Ownership
Food 
Consumption
Log (income)
Enumerator's 
Evaluation
Number of Other Known Adopters .058 .055 .054 .056
(2.08) (3.82) (4.06) (4.25)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.191 -.179 -.176 (.182)
(3.85) (3.85) (3.73) (3.84)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .3506 .3363 .3557 .3391
Observations 183 183 183 183
Table 10: Imitation Effects
T-statistics reported in parentheses (1) (2)
Number of Other Known Adopters .042 .043
(2.61) (2.76)
Number of Other Known Adopters Squared x 10-2 -.211 -.220
(4.42) (4.78)
Talks to Others About Agriculture x .024 .025
Number of Other Known Adopters (1.72) (1.82)
Richest Farmer in Village Adopts .166
(1.03)
Village Elder is of Same Religion and Adopts .128
(1.40)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R-squared .3510 .3599
Observations 183 183
